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Abstract 
With a fundamental interest in further developing and specifying the theoretical and 
ethical framework of Psychology from the Standpoint of the Subject (PSS), the article at 
hand asks: What is the PSS researcher’s position in and responsibility toward society? 
What does the theoretical concept of the co-researcher, which is so pivotal in this 
tradition, entail for conceptualizing the relationship between the academic researcher 
and all those others who participate from different societal positions? Is there a specific, 
emancipatory contribution the PSS researcher is to make to the production of societal 
conditions, including the production of knowledge? What is the contribution of the 
other co-researchers then, and how do they gain from the PSS researcher’s labor, in 
particular her scientific explorations of the world?  
The article’s analyses delve into various versions of understanding and implementing 
emancipation through psychological co-research, i.e. of how PSS research differently 
aims at bettering one another’s living conditions. First, the original methodology 
developed in the Berlin context is presented, which can be roughly described as a 
theoretically informed dialogical exchange between academically trained people. This is 
secondly followed by a critique of this model, articulated by the Scandinavian Practice 
Research tradition and mounding in substantial conceptual and methodological 
developments – in particular of the understanding of the (co-)researcher relationship. 
Thirdly, it is illustrated that Practice Research instantiated some new ambiguities, by 
analyzing its methodology of fellow knowledge gaining through the lens of cultural-
historical psychology and foremost Stetsenko’s texts on the researcher as a 
transformative activist. Finally, it proposes mutual knowledge-sharing as the primary 
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task of PSS co-research projects, in order to specify and nuance the co-researcher 
concept in relation to the conceptualization of the nominal researcher. Thereby, we 
intend to resurrect lively debates of PSS’ emancipatory potentials and contribute to 
dialogically nuancing its self-understanding. 
 
Keywords 
psychology from the standpoint of the subject, practice research, co-researcher 
principle, emancipation, mutual knowledge-sharing, cultural-historical psychology, 
transformative activist stance 
 
 
The aim of bettering societal conditions via our psychological investigations is 
deeply embedded in the emancipatory agenda of German-Scandinavian Critical 
Psychology, a.k.a. Psychology from the Standpoint of the Subject (PSS). But in 
assuming this aim, does our theoretical framework sufficiently allow for 
transparently and critically reflecting on our own self-understanding and our own 
‘emancipatory’ contributions to societal production and reproduction? With a 
fundamental interest in further developing and specifying this theoretical 
framework, the article at hand wonders: What is the PSS researcher’s position in 
and responsibility toward society? What does in particular the theoretical concept 
of the co-researcher, which is so pivotal in this tradition, entail for 
conceptualizing the relationship between the academically employed researcher 
and all those others who participate from different societal positions? After all, 
the nominal, professionalized academic researcher is mostly acting on the 
grounds of the very same societal conditions that her non-academically employed 
co-researchers are also acting on. However, some conditions are different or at 
least differently accentuated given the specific, labor-related position the nominal 
researcher enacts, for instance given the right to academic freedom secured via 
national and international legal documents, or the profane fact that the researcher 
is partly paid precisely for exploring the world in scientific ways. So, is there a 
specific contribution the nominal PSS researcher is to make to the production of 
societal conditions, including the production of knowledge, that others cannot 
make? What is the contribution of other co-researchers then, and how do they 
gain from the professionalized PSS researcher’s labor, in particular her scientific 
explorations of the world?  
The analyses presented here first delve into various versions of 
understanding and implementing emancipation through psychological co-
research, i.e. of how PSS research differently aims at bettering one another’s 
living conditions. First, the original methodology developed in the Berlin context 
is presented, which can be roughly described as a theoretically informed 
dialogical exchange between academically trained people. This is secondly 
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followed by the critique of this model, articulated by the Scandinavian Practice 
Research tradition and mounding in substantial conceptual and methodological 
developments – in particular of the understanding of the (co-)researcher 
relationship, given that all participants are engaged in conducting their respective 
everyday life. Thirdly, it is illustrated that Practice Research instantiated some 
new ambiguities, by analyzing its methodology of fellow knowledge gaining 
through the lens of cultural-historical psychology and foremost Stetsenko’s texts 
on the researcher as transformative activist. Finally, it proposes mutual 
knowledge-sharing as the primary task of PSS co-research projects, in order to 
specify and nuance the co-researcher concept in relation to the conceptualization 
of the nominal researcher. By proposing this concept, we intend to resurrect 
lively debates of PSS’ emancipatory potentials and contribute to dialogically 
nuancing its self-understanding. 
 
 
Problematizing emancipation as conceptually mediated social self-
understanding primarily aimed at academics 
 
Without any doubt, Psychology from the Standpoint of the Subject (PSS) 
has always already been promoting an emancipatory research agenda – a wish for 
bettering one another’s societal living conditions. But just as much as the 
approach has undergone a number of historical-cultural changes and 
developments since it was first introduced in the late 1960s and 1970s at the 
Freie Universität (FU) of Berlin by a group of psychologists that gathered around 
Klaus Holzkamp’s professorship, so has its understanding of what emancipation 
is, and of how it should be promoted through its research engagements, changed 
and developed, as an inevitable consequence of historical time.  
So where do we stand today, or rather: How does current PSS understand 
emancipation and emancipatory research? Is emancipation still on PSS’ agenda, 
or how explicitly is it on PSS’ agenda? Given recent calls for further 
democratizing the research processes within PSS’ Practice Research (see 
Munck, 2017; Kousholt, 2016; Højholt, 2016) and for further specifying its 
emancipatory sustainability (Chimirri, 2015), it appears that the emancipatory 
agenda of PSS stepped into the shadows of other conceptual debates and 
developments, among others of the concept conduct of everyday life (e.g., 
Holzkamp, 2013b; Dreier, 2011; Schraube & Højholt, 2016; Bader & Weber, 
2016; Chimirri, 2014; Røn Larsen & Stanek, 2015; Mørck & Celotte-Andersen, 
2016). But can the latter be sufficiently conceptualized without considering its 
emancipatory potential? After all, the theoretical concepts of PSS carry an 
immanently emancipatory heritage: They were developed to assist co-researchers 
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in unraveling and making conscious the intricate contradictoriness of everyday 
existence and of one’s own self-understanding as part of contemporary societal 
conditions. 
Accordingly, while the Marxist impetus of PSS as early German Critical 
Psychology was clearly shaped by the political activism of the student 
movement, and by its criticism of psychology as an exploitative and 
manipulative “control science” (see Holzkamp, 2013a, p. 45; Holzkamp, 2013b, 
p. 328), PSS’ project was not to smash psychology, but rather to revolutionize it 
by reconstructing its conceptual foundations: 
 
“FU delegates maintained that the problem was not with psychology as 
science in principle, but with the powers that, as a discipline, it blindly 
served. They granted that the prevailing psychology was shaped by and in 
thrall to an oppressive and exploitive ideology, but just as a psychology 
had been formed to serve oppressive interests, a genuinely critical 
psychology could be developed to serve more broadly human, 
emancipatory interests. At the very least it should be possible for such a 
psychology to clarify just what constitutes a liberated existence and to 
identify the psychological processes that mediate domination.” (Tolman, 
2009, p. 152; see also Tolman, 2008; Schraube, 2015) 
 
Psychology is, in the PSS understanding, thus to be reformulated in ways that 
serve the respective emancipation of human subjects (see also Maiers, 1991; 
Tolman, 1994; Markard, 2009; Chimirri, 2015). This is primarily attained via the 
concepts that this tradition of Critical Psychology has developed, most 
prominently that of subjectivity as both constituted by societal conditions and at 
the same time actively co-constituting these very same societal conditions that 
human beings are dependent on.  
In contrast to, for instance, subjectivity as conceptualized in 
psychoanalysis, hence, Holzkamp’s concept of subjectivity was to foreground 
“the human possibility of ending … suffering by participating oneself in changing 
the conditions causing it” (Holzkamp, 2013a, p. 33). This reconceptualization 
would render it possible “to extend and complement a critique of [psychological] 
science with a critique of society” (Papadopoulos, 2009, p. 163), though without 
adhering to an emancipatory research practice that favors practical intervention 
over theorizing. Instead, Holzkamp and colleagues engaged in theoretical debates 
for over a decade, working on grounding the concept of human subjectivity in 
meticulous transdisciplinary phylogenetic and ontogenetic analyses, before 
Holzkamp came to summarize his insights in his first opus magnum 
Grundlegung der Psychologie (‘Foundation of psychology’), issued in 1983. In 
essence, the book proposes a range of conceptual developments that nuance and 
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specify human subjectivity, so as to assist the nominal researcher and her fellow 
research participants, programmatically called co-researchers, to engage in 
dialogue and thereby to generalize agency via processes of promoting social self-
understanding (Holzkamp, 2013b). This mutual exchange of knowledge was the 
sort of critical-emancipatory research practice that PSS envisioned and promoted 
– in line with Karl Marx’ dictum that the free development of each one is the 
precondition for the free development of all, meaning that the aim of 
emancipation must (also) be the creation of societal conditions under which the 
different abilities of each person can thrive (Haug, 2016; see also Markard, 2013; 
Chimirri, 2015). 
With Tolman (2003), it can be argued that PSS wanted to reconstruct 
psychology as moral science, which strived towards mutually educating 
theoretically knowledgeable, critical and highly self-reflexive moral co-
researchers of human practice that would be deeply aware of and committed to 
their collective interdependence and to overcoming human suffering: 
 
“[Morality] emerges only on reflection of the necessary interdependence 
of the individual and humanity-at-large. Our personal interests are 
essentially and ineluctably linked to the common interest; they are … the 
particular expressions of the universal human interest. To act morally, 
however, the person must also know of his or her interdependence with 
others, must understand something of his or her own humanity, must be 
cognizant of the possibilities for action on any given occasion, and must be 
able to anticipate the practical consequences of his or her action on the 
basis of which its morality is judged. In order to act morally, and thus 
ultimately in one’s own interests, one must have true knowledge, and since 
what is needed will not always be given in sensations, this knowledge will 
have to be theoretical knowledge.” (Tolman, 2003, pp. 46-47) 
 
This understanding of emancipation as exchange of theoretical knowledge, a sort 
of collective enlightenment project that creates moral human subjects, was 
among others strongly criticized by the Scandinavian offshoot of Psychology 
from the Standpoint of the Subject (PSS) as introduced by Ole Dreier in 
Denmark: Practice Research (see Nissen, 2000; Mørck & Huniche, 2006, and 
Kousholt & Thomsen, 2013, for overviews). The critique suggests that empirical 
PSS research conducted by Holzkamp and colleagues was founded upon an 
academic ideal of promoting free symmetrical exchange among theoretically 
trained individuals within a ‘utopic’ space that itself mystifies asymmetrical 
power relations and conflicts of interest. As Nissen (2000) describes it, the 
“community of research, the project, is initiated and gathered by professional 
researchers”, where “[p]ractitioners, or co-researchers, individually decide to 
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participate. They are often students, or former students, of Critical Psychology, 
and either they have read, or begin by reading together, central books from the 
tradition” (p. 161). The discussion of everyday problems, the research 
cooperation, thus requires academic training, and accordingly tends to take place 
in university settings. This methodology inadvertently comes to define a 
community whose theorizing and self-understanding are artificially decoupled 
from other ideologically laden contexts of everyday life:  
 
“The otherwise carefully eliminated cartesian dualism creeps in simply 
because the action context that realizes the ‘generalized subject standpoint’ 
is one of theorizing. It is in the unnoticed practical constitution of the ‘we’ 
of critical psychology that a purification of an abstract general humanity 
becomes a precondition for constituting the subject of everyday life as ‘a 
subject’. Emancipated from ideology, purified by transcendental 
categories, subjects enter a virgin level of description. This entails a 
utopianism, a misrecognition of partial interest and ideology … Even the 
most frustratingly disempowered academic dispute is a concrete utopia if it 
claims to ‘be’ Critical Psychology.” (Nissen, 2000, pp. 161-162) 
 
In consequence, one of the central aims of PSS’ Practice Research is to overcome 
the artificial, arguably utopic separation of doing theory and of doing practice, 
i.e. to bridge between the production and the use of knowledge from within 
everyday life (e.g., Dreier, 2007). 
 
 
PSS Practice Research: Transgressing social inequalities through 
democratic participation across different conducts of everyday life 
 
As an alternative to the above described ‘utopic’ academic exchange, which was 
largely decontextualized and isolated from the other everyday life contexts of the 
participants, and which furthermore reproduced a binary understanding of the 
acting subject and societal conditions, Dreier, Nissen, Højholt, Mørck, and many 
other Danish critical-psychological Practice Researchers argued for engaging in 
institutionally mediated collaborations with those affected by problematic 
societal conditions: 
 
“The key idea was that of a necessity of de-centering, that is, viewing and 
pursuing, say, psycho-therapy, not, as in traditional clinical psychology, 
from the exclusive angle of the (therapist in the) therapy session itself, but 
rather as one among the many socio-culturally interconnected action 
contexts in the lives of the people involved. This meant taking seriously 
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the users’ perspectives, not as isolated attitudes or the like, but as 
perspectives relevant to the development of practice, and grounded in the 
users’ daily lives. It also meant broadening the picture of practice to see 
the structures of conflictful [sic] cooperation, delegation etc. between 
professionals, families etc.” (Nissen, 2000, p. 163) 
 
Most importantly, it became central to the Scandinavian developments of Critical 
Psychology as Practice Research from the Standpoint of the Subject to decenter 
their analytical focus from single institutionalized arrangements to seeing them 
as interrelated or connected to where and how human subjects were acting 
otherwise in their life. Thereby, the problems that the affected people who the 
researcher comes to meet could be decentered, seen in the light of problems 
elsewhere in their life, and consequently in relation to more generally present 
societal conditions. 
Within the last decade, Dreier (2009, 2011, 2016) and other Practice 
Researchers have increasingly picked up on Holzkamp’s unfinished reflections 
on the concept conduct of everyday life (Holzkamp, 2013b; originally published 
in German in 19951). Holzkamp argued for the conduct of everyday life being the 
most elementary concept in order to investigate human subjectivity and 
existence, as it is able to grasp and include the cyclicity and routinization of 
everyday life as aspects of agency, and thus as inherently relational processes 
produced and reproduced across the many contexts a subject partakes in. 
Everyday life is thus actively done by the subject, in her effort of meaningfully 
interrelating and contributing to a vast number of contexts and herewith 
contradictory life conditions: 
 
“The concept of conduct of everyday life sets us on track of investigating 
connections between structural life conditions and personal ways of 
experiencing and dealing with such life conditions. If we are to analyze 
connections between life conditions and personal reasons and meanings, 
we need to intensify our attention – and questions – to the complex and 
contradictory life conditions and (unequal) possibilities for influencing and 
changing them.” (Kousholt, 2016, p. 255) 
 
The attempt of influencing and changing contradictory life conditions, however, 
is co-dependent of all those other human beings who contribute to practice, and 
of their respectively different conducts of everyday life. Meanwhile, each human 
                                                          
1 See also the anthology edited by Schraube & Højholt (2016), the special issues edited 
by Højholt & Røn Larsen (2015) and by Chimirri, Klitmøller & Hviid (2015), as well as 
ongoing discussions in the Danish language journal Nordiske Udkast and the English 
language correspondent Outlines. Critical Practice Studies. 
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being contributes from an ontogenetically unique position and perspective, and 
we all engage in a necessarily conflictual collaboration (Busch-Jensen, 2013; 
Chimirri, 2014; both building on Axel, 2011) on at least temporarily bridging 
differences and working towards a common interest. For instance, Højholt & 
Kousholt (2011) exemplify, based on an interdisciplinary research project 
conducted with various researchers (from psychology, educational studies, and 
social work) and professionals working with the inclusion of children in 
difficulties (inclusion teachers, pedagogues, psychologists, and management), 
how the latter iteratively informed and actively co-shaped the project’s common 
research agenda: The professionals co-formulated some of the project’s research 
questions and thus main foci; the researchers’ insights were presented to the 
professionals, which triggered reflections of their respective professional 
practice; in turn, this inspired the researchers to analyze how certain 
understandings of ‘professionalism’ play into the social problems identified in 
the inclusion practice. It is this back and forth movement in the exchange of 
knowledge, an exchange which is always-also conflictual due to differing and at 
times contradictory positionings and perspectives across the many co-researchers 
partaking in the project, that Højholt & Kousholt (2011; see also their 
contribution in this ARCP volume) term mutual learning processes. 
Methodologically, the conduct of everyday life concept similarly invites the 
nominal researcher to engage in such conflictual collaborations with other 
practice contributors, so as to investigate from within practice how everyday life 
is done differently by different human beings – given their heterogeneous 
understandings of what the common interest may be on the grounds of their 
unique conducts of everyday life, as well as on the grounds of what problems 
they encounter in these processes of daily negotiation, in which the different 
perspectives must be meaningfully connected in order to develop the fellow 
practice: 
 
“Studying practices from different positions and perspectives – for 
example, talking to adults, children and various professionals – provides 
opportunities to learn about how problems and conflicts look very different 
from different perspectives, and thereby to analyze what is at stake in a 
given situation by relating the different perspectives to different positions 
and possibilities for influencing what is going on – and how these 
differences are connected in a shared (contradictory) practice, related to a 
common problem … The concepts of conduct of everyday life in 
conflictual social practice direct our analytical attention to such 
connections between personal dilemmas in reciprocal relations to social 
problems and common contradictions in social practices.” (Kousholt, 
2016, p. 255) 
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Differences among practice participants are actively being connected across the 
respective conducts of everyday life in the process of identifying and potentially 
changing what is of more common or general interest. Differences that emerge 
from within meeting one another in everyday life’s (institutionalized) practice 
arrangements point to more general ontogenetic differences, for instance a 
specific constellation of intersubjective relationships across contexts, cultural 
inspirations including cosmological, ontological and epistemological frameworks 
of understanding the world.  
Nevertheless, the general is always situated anew: Whatever connectivity 
there is across perspectives, whatever common interests and problems we can 
identify in practice, they are always already renegotiated according to an 
individual’s unique conduct of everyday life. They are connected to other 
contexts, to other conducts of everyday life, differently by each one of us human 
beings, and cast a uniquely insightful light on the ambivalences and 
contradictions of the social conditions we are upholding in practice. In such an 
understanding, differences are constitutive of the general, of the practice we 
share, which each one of us contributes differently to in situated ways – and this 
conflictual social practice with all its different constituting conducts of everyday 
life immanently carries a potentially transformative potentiality. With reference 
to Højholt (2016), Kousholt (2016) writes: 
 
“Obtaining situated knowledge about possibilities for participation, 
personal concerns and struggles – as well as insight into social conflicts, 
how they affect us differently, and how we deal with them based on 
unequal possibilities for influencing them – can produce knowledge about 
common challenges and thereby also critiques of constrained life 
conditions and unequally structured social possibilities.” (Kousholt, 2016, 
p. 254) 
 
Transformation through diversification of knowledge? 
 
The transformative potentiality of PSS’ Practice Research emerges in the coming 
together of participants’ different perspectives on social conflicts, and in the 
conflictual exchange of articulating unequal possibilities for influencing them. 
Hence, if it was not for the maintenance of unequally structured social 
possibilities for influencing common life conditions, conflictual social practice 
would indeed immanently carry a democratizing, transformative potentiality.  
However, differences or non-equalities tend to be individualized and 
thereby rendered immovable and unnegotiable in practice, which can deadlock 
conflicts’ transformative potentiality and in consequence future collaboration 
(Chimirri, 2014). Potential collaborators are henceforth othered, positioned as 
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less valuable for a productive conflictual collaboration, be it because of their 
(supposed) religious commitments (see Khawaja & Mørck, 2009), their earlier 
engagements with the gang milieu (see Mørck & Hansen, 2015), diagnoses 
received and treatments prescribed (see Kristensen & Mørck, 2016), apparent 
age, race and gender positionings (see Burman, 2017), their family’s 
socioeconomic background (see Juhl, 2014; Højholt, 2016), or even the media 
characters and narratives they prefer (see Chimirri, 2013, 2014), etc. 
Such deadlocking, individualizing preemptive categorizations of human 
subjects perpetuate the social inequalities that Højholt (2016) problematizes 
exemplarily with regard to the idea that poverty is considered generationally 
transmittable or socially inheritable. Even studies that do not hide their societally 
critical agenda, for instance of children’s unequal possibilities for participating in 
school, tend to reify structural problems such as poverty in the respective 
children: The latter are victims of the former, and their agency as well as the 
different ways such problems become manifest in the children’s everyday lives 
are lost from sight. Conflicts that emerge from within everyday life at the school, 
for instance, are therefore to be explored in a situated manner:  
 
“In research, we may explore the content of these conflicts and analyze the 
contradictory conditions in relation to these conflicts, as well as the 
possibilities for cooperation that these conflicts reveal. In relation to doing 
so, we need, among other things, theoretical developments to 
conceptualize the inner connection between societal and political conflicts 
and contradictions in everyday life, to analyze how social conflicts also 
become conflictual for persons when they conduct their everyday life.” 
(Højholt, 2016, p. 159) 
 
Instead of seeking universally valid, inequality-perpetuating knowledge about 
how certain children attract or even propel certain conflicts, or about how 
children’s possibilities have been determined by previous conflicts, it is the 
actually experienced conflicts, and how the various practice participants 
contribute to these concrete conflicts, that need to be analyzed. The participants 
contribute differently based on heterogeneous conducts of everyday life, 
diverging interests, knowledge, experiences, etc. Nevertheless, do conflicts in 
school also reveal more general aspects of societal organization, and of how 
contradictions are engrained in this organization, thus propelling new conflicts – 
e.g., due to the reification of psychological categories that preemptively 
oversimplify the complexity of a school conflict. Methodologically, then, the 
nominal PSS researcher seeks to diversify one-sided knowledge by gaining 
knowledge across different perspectives on a common issue. 
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But irrespective of such conceptual and methodological developments made 
in the pursuit of overcoming PSS’ utopic empirical research (sensu Nissen; see 
above), for instance by emphasizing how social conflicts become conflictual in 
different ways for different persons including the nominal researcher, an explicit 
call for further democratizing PSS research processes has recently been issued: 
 
“[W]e need to arrange cooperation between research and practice in ways 
that inspire open and mutual exploration of contradictions in practice and 
support joint exploration of how to change problematic conditions. In 
relation to this, it is significant to democratize the research process and 
make room for the contribution of the people involved. A part of the 
research process is to work on how to arrange conditions for the 
participation of co-researchers, and thereby the conditions for 
collaboration.” (Kousholt, 2016, p. 255; see also Højholt, 2016) 
 
Inter alia, it remains an open question in PSS’ Practice Research tradition how 
the researcher can best arrange the research process in ways where the 
researcher’s position in society, knowledge and most generally her conduct of 
everyday life can be rendered meaningful for the other co-researchers – in order 
to ground the joint exploration on a (at least temporarily stabilized) common 
understanding of what is at stake in the research project, and of who is 
contributing from what societal position in relation to what interests. Arguably, 
the focus needs to be directed more clearly towards the question of how to share 
what knowledge with whom and why, instead of how the researcher can – in the 
most ethical ways possible – gain knowledge about practice together with 
practice participants from within practice.  
This relates back to one of the most fundamental questions of every human 
and social science: Who do we, as professionalized academic researchers, do our 
research for and why? And how do we contribute to reproducing arrangements 
that co-maintain at least some of the oppressive societal conditions that we seek 
to overcome? And to what extent can we actually claim to share or collaborate on 
an issue of common interest, when we are indeed often positioned differently in 
terms of our everyday life conditions? How are our research questions, analytical 
foci, choices of who to collaborate with, etc. connected to our respective 
conducts of everyday life, of how we live our lives across academic and non-
academic practices? Ute Osterkamp has become a prominent advocate for 
considering such questions much more explicitly in PSS research, also because 
ongoing self-reflection and modesty separates PSS’ emancipatory project from 
other critical-emancipatory, academic projects: 
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“Not the stupidity, unreasonableness, mental laziness, irresponsibility, 
conformity, etc. of the respective others, but one’s tendency to thereby de-
qualify these others, is subject science’s problem. This in no way implies 
to self-censor one’s thinking and feeling, to suppress personalized 
interpretations due to political correctness, but to understand this tendency 
in its subjective and objective function as continuously reciprocated, self-
suggestive expression of dominant interests, which always includes the 
exclusion of others from one’s realm of responsibility, justified by 
assigning certain individual characteristics to these others. A critical 
engagement with society that does not also result from recognizing one’s 
own problematic behavior disentitles itself.” (Osterkamp, 1995, pp. 851-
852; authors’ translation; see also Osterkamp, 2009) 
 
It is in this critical engagement with one’s own position as researcher that PSS’ 
Practice Research has as of late sought inspiration in cultural-historical 
psychologist Anna Stetsenko’s work on the Transformative Activist Stance 
(TAS; see, e.g., Munck, 2017; Pedersen, 2015; Chimirri, 2014). Højholt (2011) 
firstly drew on Stetsenko’s work to nuance and clarify the subject-scientific 
concept of participation. The concept of participation was – in the PSS 
framework – always intended to point beyond a passive understanding of it (or 
‘minimalist’ in Carpentier’s (2011) terminology), in the sense of the Danish 
deltagelse / partaking (for a more elaborate discussion of the concept’s history, 
see Chimirri, 2014, p. 117ff). But Stetsenko’s focus, on how participants (or co-
researchers) contribute to the research process, also renders it possible to more 
poignantly ask how the nominal researcher’s conduct of everyday life actually 
contributes and ought to contribute to the other co-researchers’ conducts of 
everyday life – including how the researcher himself reproduces certain 
dominant structures and understandings and herewith social inequality. 
Stetsenko’s work grew out of a line of cultural-historical activity theorists 
who at the same time carried forward and worked on revitalizing the central 
tenets of cultural-historical activity theory (CHAT), based on the philosophical 
writings of Marx and Hegel. Hegel (1979) suggested the term Aufhebung, to refer 
to the superseding transformation of dialectical relations into new higher-level 
forms, e.g., in relation to the developing self as an ongoing synthesis (see 
Pedersen & Bang, 2016a). But how has this been brought forward in current 
cultural-historical activity theory, and what implications might it have for the 
emancipatory agenda of critical-psychological co-research? 
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Inspirations from Cultural-Historical Psychology: From participation to 
activist contribution and transformation 
 
In the earlier writings of Vygotsky, in particular, a political message that 
promoted solidarity and communion as part of an emancipatory approach was 
stressed (according to Stetsenko, 2013). This implied and put to the fore the 
significant role of individuals in creating their world. Participation has thus 
always been a central part of the conceptualization of the human lifeworld within 
the framework of Cultural-Historical Psychology (including cultural-historical 
activity theory or CHAT), as emerges from the following passage: 
 
“[H]umans come to be and come to know – each other, themselves and the 
world – while jointly enacting collective practices mediated by cultural 
tools (starting with the tools of labor, all the way to complex symbolic 
systems such as language), building on efforts of each other and on 
achievements of previous generations, while cumulatively expanding on 
and amplifying these achievements. Therefore, human activity – material, 
practical and always by necessity social, collective processes reliant on 
and mediated by cultural tools – is seen as the basic form of human social 
life that is formative of everything that is human in humans, including 
their subjectivity and its forms such as the mind, knowledge, concepts, and 
personhood. These subjective (psychological) phenomena are understood 
as related to human collaborative practices/activities and evolving in their 
midst.” (Stetsenko, 2013, p. 3) 
 
Drawing on Hegel’s notion of Aufhebung, Stetsenko (2013) employs the term 
superseding when arguing for the necessity to, theoretically, fully incorporate the 
interconnectedness of humans and their historically developed societal conditions 
in relation to our way of conceptualizing human development and societal 
change. She writes: 
 
“The term ‘superseding’ used in a dialectical sense, denotes a conceptual 
move that does not eliminate a given phenomenon or its properties but 
instead, lifts them up and includes them, albeit in a subordinate role, into a 
new systemic whole comprised, in this case, by human collaborative 
practices. That is, these practices are fully dialogical and relational, yet 
what makes them what they are, their formative feature and character 
cannot be reduced to dialogicality only. Instead their formative feature has 
to do with people collectively and materially producing the conditions of 
their existence, while along the way necessarily interacting, dialoging, 
relating, as well as and coming to develop specifically human 
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psychological processes, agency, and subjectivity.” (Stetsenko, 2013, pp. 
12-13) 
 
Here the term ‘superseding’ is used in relation to the engaged movement towards 
the co-creation of future conditions: a concurrent and ongoing future-directed 
movement that builds on existing conditions but at the same time constitutes new 
conditions. This implies a politically engaged psychology that surpasses the 
perspectives found in related ontologies, such as, e.g., a dialogical ontology. 
Stetsenko has argued extensively and repeatedly for the grounding of human 
being and becoming in collective transformative processes (see, e.g., Stensenko, 
2009, 2013), which mounded in proposing a Transformative Activist Stance 
(TAS). This proposition is not only a theoretical venture, but just as much the 
result of engagements with practice, given that it is related to practice in an 
imperative manner.  
 
Transformative activism 
 
TAS emphasizes a “collaborative practice aimed at changing the world” (Vianna 
& Stetsenko, 2011, p. 313). It was developed on groundwork laid by Vygotsky 
and his followers and thus builds on fundamental insights from dialectical 
materialism, emphasizing that humans are created qua the historical, cultural and 
material practice in which they participate, and that they through their 
participation co-create and develop themselves. Such a dialectical view of the 
subject co-constituting the world that the very same subject is constituted by 
clearly underlines the Marxian roots that both Cultural-Historical Psychology and 
PSS share. 
In addition to these approaches, the TAS approach draws inspiration from 
Social Practice Theory (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998), as well as the 
work of Liberation Pedagogy sensu Freire (Freire, 2000). It aims at further 
expanding these theoretical traditions in the line of an activist approach (Vienna 
& Stetsenko, 2011), which implies that in relation to enforcing the view of 
learning as embedded in participation in community practices, it enlarges the 
emphasis on the way in which individuals contribute to collaborative 
transformative processes. This contribution is emphasized as the “constitutive 
ontological grounding for human development” (Vianna & Stetsenko 2011:317). 
TAS can thus be regarded as a simultaneous prolongation and expansion of the 
notion of participation in that it stresses the unique contributions to co-creative 
processes. In the words of Stetsenko: 
 
“TAS highlights the notion that individuals contribute to collaborative 
transformative practices (in contradistinction with and a dialectical 
NIKLAS A. CHIMIRRI & SOFIE PEDERSEN   619 
 
 
expansion of the notion of participation) through their own unique deeds 
and their co-authoring of historically unfolding social practices. In this 
vein, collaborative practices are posited as ontologically primary, yet they 
are understood to be continuously and cumulatively evolving through 
unique activist contributions by individual participants, who always act as 
social subjects, and always matter in one way or another because they are 
directly implicated in creating their realities of existence and their 
development, and thus, in social transformations of the world.” (Stetsenko, 
2013, p. 9) 
 
The transformative motion and activist potential embedded in the TAS approach 
relates to the creation of future societal conditions, and arguably implies a moral 
subject (sensu Tolman; see above) committed to and participating in co-creative 
collective processes. The commitment is to not only participate, but to participate 
and take a stance in relation to creating a desirable future for oneself and others: 
 
“[It is important to] consider not only the present communal practices and 
their history, but, in addition, the relevance of the forward-looking activist 
positioning by the learners via-à-vis the future of these practices and of a 
commitment to social change in order to bring this future into reality.” 
(Vianna & Stetsenko, 2011, p. 320; cf. also Stetsenko, 2008)  
 
The historically grounded forward-looking or forward-directedness is also found 
in the very core tenets of activity theory, in relation to its conceptualizations of 
psychogenesis (see Leontjev, 2002). In a Danish elaboration of the works of 
Leontjev and colleagues, Engelsted (1989) highlights the forward-directedness as 
central to not only the human psyche, but also to psychology itself: Psychology 
begins with the phenomenon of reference to the future. He proposes the term 
auto-kinesis to account for this reference to the future, and suggests that the basic 
and primary kind of activity must be a behavioral relating-to the world. This is to 
describe the particular human ability to take a productive stance in relation to the 
world, and not only, as proposed by many other branches of psychology, to act in 
responsive and reproductive manners (in Engelsted’s terminology, servo-kinesis). 
Simply put, autokinesis implies the ability of simple organisms to self-initiate 
action in relation to seeking food, however it also implies the ability of humans 
to engage in activist transformative collective processes in relation to co-creating 
future societal structure – and in that very same process changing themselves (cf. 
Engelsted, 1989; see also Bang, 2009a, 2009b; Pedersen & Bang, 2016b). 
Stetsenko integrates this perspective in her proposition that identity – and thus 
processes of becoming – comprises of meaningful life-projects and forward-
looking stances:  
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“Given that identity, within the TAS, is understood as having to do with a 
meaningful life project, it is this forward-looking stance in which cultural 
tools are revealed in their potential application within one’s activist 
pursuits that can render knowledge relevant, turning learning into a 
personally and socially meaningful endeavour.” (Vianna & Stetsenko, 
2011, p. 320) 
 
Stetsenko henceforth presents “an activist project of historical becoming through 
collaborative pursuits of social transformation” (Stetsenko, 2012, p. 144). She 
continues by proposing that at the very core of human development lies an 
“activist stance via-à-vis the world” (ibid.); this idea is based on the premise that 
collaborative transformative practice is the grounding for not only human Being, 
but also human Becoming – thereby stressing the active nature of human beings 
(as being constantly involved in processes of transformation). Accordingly, she 
critically addresses the models of personhood that are in circulation today, 
arguing that they have a tendency to portray individuals as not only subjected to 
the influence and power of outside forces in relation to which they are 
themselves powerless, but also that they are profoundly disconnected from other 
individuals and thereby to be understood as unrelated and unattached to others, if 
not even in dire need to protect oneself from them. She builds on the groundwork 
already laid in earlier publications (though this time also referring to 
philosophers Merleau-Ponty and Levinas) in order to establish the inherently 
relational character of personhood and human development. From here she 
suggests the logical – and necessary – step to be the dialectical expansion of 
relationality: 
 
“The next step in theorizing personhood and human development after 
establishing their relational character is, in my view, to dialectically 
expand relationality through the notion that human development is an 
activist project that is not only imbued with dialogism, ethics, and 
interrelatedness but also, and more originary, is grounded in collaborative, 
purposeful, and answerable deeds ineluctably colored by visions of and 
commitments to a particular project of social transformation.” (Stetsenko, 
2012, p. 147) 
 
This dialectical expansion of relationality is thus an elaboration of the 
Vygotskyan project for and with psychology: Vygotsky proposed the superseding 
of a foundational understanding of connectivity through adaptation into an 
understanding of active adaption, or what Stetsenko terms “active collaborative 
transformation of nature” (Stetsenko, 2012, p. 148). Development can thus be 
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regarded as continuous transformations in relation to persons’ value-laden 
engagements within an individual-environment reciprocity that also, through the 
very same engagements, undergo changes over time. In this view, subjectivity is 
a (momentary) result of ongoing engagements in collective activities, and a 
forward-directed relatedness to the world one opts to create for oneself – and 
others (see also Pedersen, 2015; Pedersen & Bang, 2016a). 
 
The emancipatory methodology of TAS 
 
In their recount of an empirical project, Vianna & Stetsenko (2011) present how 
newness and transformative processes emerge among marginalized adolescents 
with immigrant backgrounds at a New York orphanage through Vianna’s intense 
and long-lasting engagements in and with practice; or in other words: how a 
transformative agenda became the product of collective developmental processes. 
Vianna’s approach to working with the boys in the orphanage transgressed the 
traditional clinical approach of administering individualized therapy sessions, 
and of focusing on the mastering of symptoms of mental illness. Instead, Vianna 
– taking on a TAS approach – aimed at establishing fruitful collaborative projects 
with the boys and thereby collective learning processes: from initial museum 
visits and watching movies to the establishment of a book club. After some time, 
as mutual trust deepened, and a sense of solidarity grew among the participants, 
this joint engagement was expanded into more formal collaborative learning 
processes as shared activity, alongside which the boys developed their own 
motives for actively taking part in the learning processes (more formally 
connected to the educational system). This meant that “collaborative learning 
activities became the leading activity in the group home and institutional 
practices geared towards control and punishment dramatically receded” (Vianna 
& Stetsenko, 2011, p. 327).  
Given the marginalized position of the boys at the orphanage, one may here 
question whether the transformative activist agenda fully demonstrates its 
potential, in that the zone of proximal development for the boys appears almost 
too obvious, as an alternative to traditional treatment plans and interventions 
building on medical ontologies of the human being. Also, the positions of the 
researcher and the co-researchers are not fully unfolded as such in relation to a 
joint project that is equally changing for all participants, which could imply a 
tendency to reproducing the standard privileged positions for the nominal 
academic researcher or psychologist. However, it still demonstrates how 
psychologists with an explicitly activist research agenda may engage from within 
practice according to the interests articulated by the other co-researchers, and 
through this contribute to the co-creation of mutually explorative practices with 
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the potential and power to transform not only ways of participating, but also 
ways of being and becoming in the world and relating to the world.  
The challenge – or criticism – to German Critical Psychology, as it was 
articulated by the Scandinavian Practice Research development of PSS, with 
regard to who can rightfully be qualified as co-researchers that may contribute to 
formulating the common research interest, is, one can argue, overcome in TAS, 
where collective projects are intended to be more open-ended and to a larger 
degree determined by the motivation of all co-researchers, rather than foremost 
by the academically working, nominal researchers. Irrespectively, it also here 
remains unclear to what extent the presence of a professionalized researcher, or 
otherwise engaged outsider to the practice of concern, needs to assume the 
central role in initiating, facilitating, or maintaining a potentially transformative 
project. Moreover, it posits the question – a moral and ethical one – of the nature 
of the societal structure and practice that we are co-creating: The future-oriented 
nature of the TAS proposes an open-ended ongoing process, while at the same 
time pre-emphasizing a moral responsibility in relation to an unknown future 
society. So, towards what kind of future society – and for whom – are we 
contributing as nominal researchers, and in what way? Is it similar to the (also 
largely undefined) democratically organized society that Practice Research 
envisions? What would a purposefully transformed, or an emancipated society 
look like? Or may TAS and PSS Practice Research agree that these are questions 
that can only emerge from within the concrete co-research processes, and need to 
be renegotiated across all practices one contributes to together with all co-
explorers – and that thus democratizing the research process, its conceptual 
frame and its methodology, must be the primary aim? 
 
 
Discussion: Taking a transformative activist perspective on PSS’ 
emancipatory engagements 
 
We now take Kousholt’s (2016) above cited call for further democratizing the 
research process as point of departure for arguing that adopting a more explicit 
Transformative Activist Stance (TAS) sensu Stetsenko and colleagues may be 
helpful in pursuing this democratizing engagement. In fact, some PSS Practice 
Research has adopted a similar transformative agenda throughout its projects, 
precisely in order to render the nominal academic researcher’s relationship to 
other co-researchers as democratic as possible. However, we find this 
democratization process as envisioned in PSS Practice Research to be 
discursively somewhat void of some of the philosophical aspects further 
explicated in the TAS, which rather point in the direction of developing one 
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another as – with Tolman (2003; see above) – moral human subjects. The latter 
understanding of emancipation as developing morality by theorizing one 
another’s societal conditions together not only resonates well with Stetsenko’s 
view that human development is an activist project “grounded in collaborative, 
purposeful, and answerable deeds ineluctably colored by visions of and 
commitments to a particular project of social transformation” (Stetsenko, 2012, 
p. 147), as what is considered collaboratively purposeful to transform is 
ineluctably (also) a theoretical question and requires dialogue and conflictual 
negotiation. In this sense, it furthermore resonates well with the mutual learning 
process demanded by Højholt & Kousholt (2011; also Højholt & Kousholt, this 
ARCP volume; and Kousholt, 2016; see above), but, and this is where we see the 
primary theoretical discrepancy, only if this critical learning process explicitly 
acknowledges and takes as analytical starting point the researcher’s own 
reproduction of problematic conditions (cf. Osterkamp, 1995; see above).  
Crucially, this would entail understanding the nominal academic researcher 
beyond her professionalized positioning as fellow human and potentially moral 
subject, who acts across a multiplicity of contexts far beyond the professional 
ones – just as much as it entails understanding the research participants precisely 
as subjects co-researching joint (problematic) conditions in the world, not only in 
their respective professionalized or otherwise institutionalized practice. Human 
existence, a conduct of everyday life, always already interrelates contexts and 
societal conditions, and merely focusing on the problems emerging from within 
professional-institutional contexts reduces possibilities for mutual social self-
understanding. Arguably, this is what the TAS fundamentally aims at 
superseding: By terming the researcher (and potentially everyone else) a 
transformative activist, it fundamentally democratizes our point of departure – 
not by doing away with individual ontogenetic differences, but by critically 
questioning the positions and categories the current societal arrangement keeps in 
stock for us. These positions and categories potentially fixate and deadlock the 
knowledge we aim at gaining from a dialogue, instead of actively exploring one 
another’s curiosities and knowledge interests first, so as to potentially also 
question our own knowledge interest and ensuing actions in the conducts of our 
everyday life. 
Processes of emancipatory democratization of research processes, then, 
require an explicitly symmetrical ontological and epistemological grounding of 
fellow co-researcher relations, which acknowledges one another’s 
interdependency not only in epistemic terms, i.e. gaining knowledge of the 
respective other’s perspective and conduct of everyday life, but also of actively 
needing to collaborate on creating optimal (democratizing) conditions for 
purposefully and transparently sharing knowledge with one another – for our co-
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exploration here and now, as well as for the future orientations we already are 
negotiating and still are to negotiate. In these fellow being-becoming processes 
of co-exploratory negotiation of conducts of everyday life, processes that can 
never be fully anticipated but that we are nevertheless always already directed 
towards, manifold models of what a democratic co-exploration and negotiation 
entail are themselves up for negotiation. As can for instance be seen in a dialogic 
exchange between critical social theorist Axel Honneth and political philosopher 
Jacques Rancière (Genel & Deranty, 2016),2 democratic ideals are at stake in all 
human relationships, and according to PSS, it is also at stake in one’s self-
understanding (and thus, following Engelsted, in one’s autokinetic directedness). 
Arguably, the nominal academic researcher, at least on the grounds of a 
transformative activist self-understanding, who may of course enact a different 
set of democratic ideas than other co-researchers (including other nominal PSS 
researchers, as can be seen in the below case examples of recent, prototypical 
PSS projects) given a differently conducted everyday life, should work towards 
explicating this philosophical-political dimension in the fellow co-exploration of 
everyday life. Otherwise the democratic ideals at stake cannot be co-explored 
and democratically negotiated amongst the co-researchers, thus reproducing an 
impoverished version of the conduct of everyday life, of the societal 
arrangements produced and reproduced, and consequently of the problematic 
conditions shared – for instance social inequality. 
Institutionalized spaces and knowledge interests, including a 
professionalized academic researcher’s research questions, can certainly assist in 
providing optimal conditions for purposefully and transparently sharing 
knowledge with one another about one’s ambiguous and at times contradictory 
self-understanding in the conduct of everyday life, at least at the outset of fellow 
explorative and transformative processes: The ‘utopic’ academic exchange 
criticized by Nissen (2000; see above) may indeed provide inspiration for 
creating similar spaces of fellow dialogue as can be found in research groups etc., 
as for instance the ‘reflection spaces’ with Early Childhood workers instantiated 
by Munck (2017, pp. 63ff) as part of her PhD project at a crèche. The main 
problem with these ‘utopic’ contexts, on the other hand, is that they can easily 
become isolated from other contexts through which everyday life is conducted, 
and that other potential co-researchers of everyday life are shunned from 
emancipatory processes.  
                                                          
2 We would like to thank Jacob Klitmøller for suggesting this reference, which could 
have certainly been worthwhile analyzing in depth in the context of this paper, given 
that it introduces into and contrasts two similarly emancipatory-critical, and yet 
fundamentally different approaches to doing social science – due to different underlying 
democratic ideals. However, that would have taken the article in yet another, more 
political-philosophical direction, which must be saved for another publication. 
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Meanwhile, the danger of isolating research processes from other contexts 
of everyday life is just as much looming when engaging in research processes 
from within institutional practice outside the alma mater. Here, the utopic 
exchange between theoretically trained critical psychologists is transferred to an 
utopic exchange between (welfare) professionals, based on their respective, 
societally prearranged tasks, duties and responsibilities including diverging, 
position-mediated knowledge interests: The nominal academic researcher gains 
knowledge from the other working professionals in order to pursue the academic 
interest of dialoging with other academics on academically relevant issues and 
publishing on them; in return the professionals may gain academically mediated 
knowledge for improving their respective professional practice. But is this 
emancipatory in the sense of sharing knowledge in order to improve shared life 
conditions for the conduct of everyday life? How is the knowledge gained 
relevant to other contexts one partakes in, how can this knowledge be translated 
into a committed, transcontextually transformative activist and thus moral 
conduct of everyday life? Is it necessary and possible to also put the democratic 
ideal, materialized in the institutional practice under scrutiny, up for a broader, 
potentially diversifying discussion and negotiation that supersedes the given 
arrangements for conducting everyday life here and now and in the future? And 
does that presuppose that the transformative activist PSS researcher explicitly 
opens up for a negotiation of one’s own democratic ideals, or is PSS’ conceptual 
frame and methodology bound to a specific set of ideals that just need to be 
rendered transparent to the other co-researchers? 
A second danger consists in preemptively labeling potential co-researchers 
as institutionalized children, marginalized youth, psychiatric patients, 
technology-sceptic elderly, welfare professionals, or what not, and thereby 
assuming to already have gained a universally valid knowledge about the 
respective participants one comes to collaborate with. These categorizations and 
positionings may preemptively shun unthought-of possibilities for initiating 
emancipatory-transformative processes relevant to one another’s conduct of 
everyday life beyond our preassigned societal roles and labels, by collaborating 
with one another as fellow human beings (or transformative activists). Of course, 
this is not a corollary: Plenty of highly creative, collaborative and thus potentially 
transformative projects start out by working with pre-labelled, marginalized 
groups and gradually transcend related knowledge presumptions, be it in 
therapeutic contexts (e.g., Minken, 2002; Borup & Pedersen, 2010a, 2010b), 
social work contexts (e.g., Mørck, 2006; Nissen, 2012), or in educational 
contexts as in Vianna & Stetsenko’s (2011) case. 
However, as soon as we start operating with ‘marginalized’ persons, we 
start thinking ourselves as ‘privileged’ researchers, and such labels can certainly 
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be important in order to pose critical questions to one’s own conduct of everyday 
life as Osterkamp (1995; see above) points out. But it should not alone guide 
one’s knowledge interest and ontological presumptions when engaging in 
collaborative practice with whomever. Otherwise, a third danger looms: That of 
initiating one-sided and potentially instrumentalizing interventions, which solely 
focus on helping the Other and thus disregard the fact that every collaboration is 
also intended to help oneself in transcending one’s self-understanding for 
conducting a more purposeful, collective conduct of everyday life. PSS Practice 
Research, just as much as TAS research, needs to be careful not to engage in 
therapeutic interventions, whose purpose “is to help clients address and 
overcome problems troubling them in their everyday lives” (Dreier, 2015, p. 
114). The purpose of emancipatory (co-)research cannot be to help 
(institutionalized, professionalized) welfare users address and overcome 
problems troubling them in their everyday lives, as both ‘them’ and ‘we’ are 
always already more than users, irrespective of what societal arrangement we are 
constituting and constituted by. We should never underestimate the potential to 
supersede the ‘user’ label together with others, as we actively contribute to 
creating the (institutionalized, professionalized, welfare, neoliberal) societal 
arrangement we are part of. Quintessentially, this is what we understand the 
Transformative Activist Stance to want to boldly underline: We delve into every 
collaboration with all our existence, our conduct of everyday life, as moral 
subjects – and never only as ‘researchers’ or ‘professionals’ or ‘marginalized’ or 
‘clients’, but as transformative activists. 
An interesting example of how initial labels were superseded as part of a 
PSS practice co-research project can be found in Line Lerche Mørck’s recent 
work. Together with a former gang member, called Peter Hansen, she co-
authored a piece in which they describe and theorize their collaboration over the 
stretch of over a year: It is entitled From rocker to academic (Mørck & Hansen, 
2015; translated from Danish; see also the follow-up work: Mørck & Celotte-
Andersen, 2016). Peter initially contacted Line after reading about her research 
on exit-programs on popular media, in which she recommended that gang 
members should be invited into tertiary educational institutions. Via a long 
process of approximating one another’s self-understanding, Line assisted Peter in 
partly superseding his societally marginalized position as criminal gang member 
towards heading to university and initiating an academic career. Without further 
elaboration of the details, it clearly emerges from the article that the nominal 
academic researcher, Line Lerche Mørck, as well as the nominal research 
participant, Peter Hansen, went into this collaboration on more symmetrical 
footing in terms of uncertainty of what to expect from one another, of what it 
means to be a gang member and what it means to be an academic with much 
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more at stake than these positionings: In our reading, they went into the 
collaboration together as transformative activists. Certainly, this is but one 
prototype for thinking TAS more explicitly (it has always already been there, we 
would argue) into PSS Practice Research and its emancipatory agenda, and it also 
remains to be seen whether and how this one-to-one collaboration may supersede 
the two co-researchers’ conducts of everyday life including enacted democratic 
ideals. However, it constitutes a noteworthy example of how a nominal PSS 
researcher, as a moral human being, renders her own positioning and self-
understanding transparent and up for renegotiation (also amongst colleagues who 
may disagree with such a personal approach) in order to engage in a potentially 
transformative collaborative project. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Critical psychological Psychology from the Standpoint of the Subject (PSS) and 
cultural-historical Transformative Activist Stance (TAS) fundamentally share a 
common point of departure in Marxian thought and its emancipatory ideal that 
the free development of each one is the precondition for the free development of 
all. How this ideal is implemented, meanwhile, varies not only across these two 
approaches, but also within PSS and its Practice Research tradition. Generally, 
the understanding of emancipation as well as the methodology enacted depends 
on who the nominal academic researcher primarily intends to collaborate with, 
categorizable as: academically trained peers, non-academically working welfare 
professionals, marginalized youth, therapeutic clients, etc. As emerges from the 
discussion of PSS via a TAS lens, we argue that both approaches in essence seek 
to supersede such categorizations (and perhaps also the implied division of 
labor), in order to promote social self-understanding of the conditions we are 
together dependent of, and thereby to initiate, in Højholt & Kousholt’s (2011) 
words, mutual learning processes. TAS can help in rendering the point of 
departure for such collaborations more symmetrical, by clarifying that all 
collaborators are – ontologically speaking – transformative activists. Such a 
nuanced social self-understanding of the common point of departure would help 
promote psychology as a moral science sensu Tolman (2003; see above). 
This would furthermore require developing better methodologies for 
promoting the transparent mutual sharing of knowledge, of one’s self-
understanding, one’s democratic ideals, etc., rather than the more instrumental 
gaining of knowledge from one another primarily for one’s own (research or 
professional) interests’ sake. It would require establishing a different set of 
standards for academic knowledge production in the Social Sciences and 
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Humanities, via which the human being is regarded as a transformative activist 
subject, who constantly co-explores the world with others, thus co-shaping the 
knowledge base of one another, while morally committed to bettering one 
another’s life conditions – for the sake of one’s own interdependency with each 
other’s conducts of everyday life. One solution could be to couple collaborative 
methodologies more explicitly to all co-researchers’ conducts of everyday life, so 
as to be able to transparently share knowledge in situ in relation to engagements 
one anyway is already engaged in. By exploring how to best resonate with one 
another’s everyday life methodologies (or one another’s ways of approaching the 
world and one another), one comes to explore one another’s ways of sharing 
knowledge and engage with what one wants to transform in specific democratic 
ways.  
However, this does not imply that the supposedly ‘utopic’, conceptually 
mediated academic exchange is entirely worthless: It may be important to uphold 
institutionally arranged spaces where the immediacy of experiencing everyday 
life is – to some degree – artificially suspended; for the sake of creating a 
common space for focused dialogic reflection and democratic renegotiation. 
After all, social self-understanding and intervention should ideally go hand in 
hand, and the development of practice (both ‘non-academic’ and ‘academic’!) is 
dependent on the development of each and everyone’s conduct of everyday life. 
Therefore, creating such spaces must not be limited to academia, as for instance 
Munck’s (2017) above mentioned ‘reflection spaces’ with daycare staff illustrate. 
Academic exchange may precisely be taken as example for how necessary such 
spaces for fellow and potentially emancipatory reflection of research questions, 
analytical foci, ethical reverberations, and communication of insights across 
other contexts are.  
Emancipation entails forward-looking fellow development through 
individual development and vice versa, and it is fundamentally conflictual as all 
affected need to have a say in it. What is needed, then, is to further develop 
concepts for how the communicative exchange of explorative interests and 
ensuing interventions can be rendered more invitational, mutual, and caring, via 
an inherently relational and processual methodology of interrelating 
ontogenetically unique, but nevertheless entirely interdependent, conducts of 
everyday life in more generally relevant ways. Critically combining the 
emancipatory projects of PSS and TAS, we suggest, may offer the conceptual, 
ontological, epistemological and ethical-moral grounds for such a 
methodological development, which remain to be further elaborated. 
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